Multiple measures of decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. jumping to conclusions (JTC), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), win-switch behavior, random exploration) have been associated with delusional thinking in independent studies. Yet, it is unknown whether these variables explain shared or unique variance in delusional thinking, and whether these relationships are specific to paranoia or delusional ideation more broadly. Additionally, the underlying computational mechanisms require further investigation. To investigate these questions, task and self-report data were collected in 88 individuals (46 healthy (...) controls, 42 schizophrenia-spectrum) and included measures of cognitive biases and behavior on probabilistic reversal learning and explore/exploit tasks. Of those, only win-switch rate significantly differed between groups. In regression, reversal learning performance, random exploration, and poor evidence integration during BADE showed significant, independent associations with paranoia. Only self-reported JTC was associated with delusional ideation, controlling for paranoia. Computational parameters increased the proportion of variance explained in paranoia. Overall, decision-making influenced by strong volatility and variability is specifically associated with paranoia, whereas self-reported hasty decision-making is specifically associated with other themes of delusional ideation. These aspects of decision-making under uncertainty may therefore represent distinct cognitive processes that, together, have the potential to worsen delusional thinking across the psychosis spectrum. (shrink)

Filosofi og pædagogik er gamle fæller, og der er et overlap mellem filosofiens historie og pædagogikkens historiske litteratur. Store tænkere som Platon, Aristoteles, Augustin, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart og Dewey hører hjemme begge steder. I den pædagogiske filosofi kan almene teoretiske og praktisk filosofiske spørgsmål udforskes systematisk og historisk. Gennem diskussioner af sådanne spørgsmål kan man forholde sig mere nysgerrigt, bevidst, begrundet og kritisk til pædagogisk praksis såvel som til pædagogisk teori, empiri og undervisningsteknologi. -/- Fællesskabet er (...) ikke uproblematisk. Pædagogik er ikke filosofi, og pædagogisk filosofi ikke kun pædagogik. Både didaktik og almen pædagogik kan komme i konflikt med pædagogisk filosofi. Hvordan kan almene pædagogiske spørgsmål overhovedet belyses filosofisk, og hvad betyder de for filosofien selv? En pædagogisk filosofisk tilgang forandrer kanon i både pædagogik og filosofi. Udvalget af nøgletekster ændres. Emner, der er værd at diskutere, forskydes. Nye forskningsspørgsmål og prioriteringer viser sig. Et pædagogisk perspektiv på filosofiens udvikling vil fremhæve dens bidrag til at forstå ’den pædagogiske problem- og fænomenverden’, ligesom et filosofisk perspektiv på pædagogikken vil flytte – eller rettere udvide – fokus med hensyn til dens idéhistorie såvel som dens aktuelle teoretiske praksis. Som i al anden filosofi kan man i den pædagogiske filosofi diskutere teoretiske og praktiske, såvel som poetiske og æstetiske spørgsmål; men det er typisk med en særlig vinkel, nemlig den pædagogiske. Man kan således diskutere erkendelse, viden og sandhed, ligeså vel som man kan undersøge ret, retfærdighed og skønhed. Ofte vil det være med en særlig tvist. Den pædagogiske filosofi kan vise sig som særegen både ved sin særlige position og ved at relatere sig til det pædagogiske som genstandsfelt. Hvad denne position og dette genstandsfelt egentlig er, er der dog ingen enighed om. Det kan ikke engang siges at være udelukkende pædagogisk defineret, og derfor må den pædagogiske filosofi forholde sig åbent til begge dele. Studier i pædagogisk filosofi indbyder til denne drøftelse. (shrink)

Ce recueil a pour but de montrer que Heidegger n'est pas seulement, et peut-etre pas d'abord, ce penseur solitaire de Foret-Noire pretant l'oreille a la voix de l'Etre, comme on s'est souvent plu a le presenter, et comme il a sans doute lui-meme contribue a le faire accroire: c'est un penseur extraordinairement attentif aux developpements philosophiques de son temps, dont la pensee s'est elaboree en grande partie en dialogue non seulement avec les Grecs, la pensee chretienne, l'existentialisme de Kierkegaard ou (...) encore la phenomenologie husserlienne, mais egalement avec ses predecesseurs immediats (Dilthey, Brentano, Bergson, Braig, York von Wartenburg), les ecoles neokantiennes de Bade (Rickert, Lask) et de Marbourg (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer), ainsi qu'avec certains contemporains, tels Jaspers ou Scheler. Des ses debuts, sa pensee s'avere ouverte aussi bien aux avancees de la logique mathematique (Frege et Russell) que, plus tard, aux developpements de l'anthropologie et de la biologie de son epoque (von Uexkull). Cette mise en perspective, qui nous parait plus que jamais necessaire, permet ainsi de mettre en lumiere des aspects negliges de l'oeuvre, de mieux comprendre les sources et, peut-etre, certaines limites de celui qui demeure, malgre l'ombre qui pese sa pensee, l'un des plus grands philosophes du XXe siecle. (shrink)

Résumé — Bien que le « social » ne soit pas un thème central du néokantisme de Bade, il est néanmoins l’occasion de développer, dans le contexte de ce courant philosophique, ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui une ontologie sociale, qui peut être élaborée de manière exemplaire dans la perspective de Rickert. La conception fondamentale de la philosophie de l’histoire, que j’analyse, offre chez Rickert la clef d’une détermination formelle de l’ontologie sociale. En outre, Rickert offre une base systématique qui permet (...) de définir le « social ». Les tenants de l’école de Bade, tels Windelband, Bauch, Cohn, voient, comme Rickert, dans le « social » la condition de la réalisation de la culture ; mais à la différence de ce dernier, cette sphère revêt chez eux une coloration éthique.— Although the « social » is not a core concept of the Southwest school of Neo-Kantianism, this philosophy offers beginnings for the development of what is nowadays called social ontology. I develop this point by presenting an analysis of Rickert’s concept of the philosophy of history. He turns out to be the key for a formal determination of a social ontology. Moreover, Rickert also offers a systematic beginning as far as the content of the social is concerned. Like Rickert also other thinkers of the Southwest school conceive the social as a condition for realizing values, but unlike Rickert in their model the sphere of realization has an « ethical » flavour. (shrink)

A many-valued (aka multiple- or multi-valued) semantics, in the strict sense, is one which employs more than two truth values; in the loose sense it is one which countenances more than two truth statuses. So if, for example, we say that there are only two truth values—True and False—but allow that as well as possessing the value True and possessing the value False, propositions may also have a third truth status—possessing neither truth value—then we have a many-valued semantics in the (...) loose but not the strict sense. A many-valued logic is one which arises from a many-valued semantics and does not also arise from any two-valued semantics [Malinowski, 1993, 30]. By a ‘logic’ here we mean either a set of tautologies, or a consequence relation. We can best explain these ideas by considering the case of classical propositional logic. The language contains the usual basic symbols (propositional constants p, q, r, . . .; connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔; and parentheses) and well-formed formulas are defined in the standard way. With the language thus specified—as a set of well-formed formulas—its semantics is then given in three parts. (i) A model of a logical language consists in a free assignment of semantic values to basic items of the non-logical vocabulary. Here the basic items of the non-logical vocabulary are the propositional constants. The appropriate kind of semantic value for a proposition is a truth value, and so a model of the language consists in a free assignment of truth values to basic propositions. Two truth values are countenanced: 1 (representing truth) and 0 (representing falsity). (ii) Rules are presented which determine a truth value for every proposition of the language, given a model. The most common way of presenting these rules is via truth tables (Figure 1). Another way of stating such rules—which will be useful below—is first to introduce functions on the truth values themselves: a unary function ¬ and four binary functions ∧, ∨, → and ↔ (Figure 2).. (shrink)

The spirit of Aelius Donatus must be uneasy of late years; so many scholars have attempted to evoke his ghost. Professor H. J. Thomson professes to see in the additional notes to Servius an image once removed from the true Donatus. ‘The question’, he writes, ‘how far we can assume that the words of Donatus are directly reproduced [in the additions first published by Daniel ] can hardly be satisfactorily answered.’ That Donatus was not the immediate source of D, Thomson (...) endeavours to show from three instances, in two of which we know for certain, either from the Glossaries or from Servius himself, the substance of a part, at least, of the note of Donatus on these passages. In the other the argument rests on the comparative meagreness of the note in the enlarged Servius. In all three cases, according to this theory, we have a rehandling of the D comment. The note on the passage from the Aeneid has already been discussed by Professor Thomson in his study of the Virgil scholia in the Abstrusa glossary. The conclusions reached there are repeated, though perhaps not so positively, in the article under discussion. I hold with Professor Rand that we have in Servius auctus substantially the voice of Donatus, though in a fragmentary form, due to the work of a compiler who, with Servius as a basis, has worked in with more or less success explanatory matter which departed from, or was an addition to, the information supplied by an interpreter who himself derived most of his material from Donatus. (shrink)

A superconducting transition temperature as high as 100 K was recently discovered in one monolayer FeSe grown on SrTiO3. The discovery ignited efforts to identify the mechanism for the markedly enhanced Tc from its bulk value of 8 K. There are two main views about the origin of the Tc enhancement: interfacial effects and/or excess electrons with strong electron correlation. Here, we report the observation of superconductivity below 20 K in surface electron-doped bulk FeSe. The doped surface layer possesses all (...) the key spectroscopic aspects of the monolayer FeSe on SrTiO3. Without interfacial effects, the surface layer state has a moderate Tc of 20 K with a smaller gap opening of 4.2 meV. Our results show that excess electrons with strong correlation cannot induce the maximum Tc, which in turn reveals the need for interfacial effects to achieve the highest Tc in one monolayer FeSe on SrTiO3. (shrink)

This article attempts to illustrate the originality, depth, and farsightedness of Joseph Raz's conception, especially his idea that legal norms provide us with protected reasons to act, that is, with first-order reasons to behave as they prescribe, and with second-order, exclusionary reasons not to act for reasons against what they prescribe. But the article also highlights some aspects that raise doubts in my mind, especially with regard to the scope of these exclusionary reasons. This in two ways: by asking, on (...) the one hand, in what sense and subject to what limits legal norms provide exclusionary reasons for the organs entrusted with applying the law, especially for judges, and on the other hand, how and to what extent legal norms provide citizens with exclusionary reasons. So, in recognizing the strength of the Razian conception, the article also points to some of the difficulties it faces. (shrink)

Bart Streumer employs a reductio ad absurdum to show that a hyperintensional conception of properties has a multiplication problem; roughly, this conception of properties leads to the absurd result that we can multiply distinct but co-intensional properties without end. In this paper, I will explain why Streumer’s reductio fails to convince.

Opstellen van een hoogleraar in de wijsbegeerte.

There is some complementarity of models for the origin of the electroencephalogram (EEG) and neural network models for information storage in brainlike systems. From the EEG models of Freeman, of Nunez, and of the authors' group we argue that the wavelike processes revealed in the EEG exhibit linear and near-equilibrium dynamics at macroscopic scale, despite extremely nonlinear – probably chaotic – dynamics at microscopic scale. Simulations of cortical neuronal interactions at global and microscopic scales are then presented. The simulations depend (...) on anatomical and physiological estimates of synaptic densities, coupling symmetries, synaptic gain, dendritic time constants, and axonal delays. It is shown that the frequency content, wave velocities, frequency/wavenumber spectra and response to cortical activation of the electrocorticogram (ECoG) can be reproduced by a “lumped” simulation treating small cortical areas as single-function units. The corresponding cellular neural network simulation has properties that include those of attractor neural networks proposed by Amit and by Parisi. Within the simulations at both scales, sharp transitions occur between low and high cell firing rates. These transitions may form a basis for neural interactions across scale. To maintain overall cortical dynamics in the normal low firing-rate range, interactions between the cortex and the subcortical systems are required to prevent runaway global excitation. Thus, the interaction of cortex and subcortex via corticostriatal and related pathways may partly regulate global dynamics by a principle analogous to adiabatic control of artificial neural networks. (shrink)

We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for permissions and obligations: -/- - a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Pφ iff every exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of permissibility of the act, and (...) -/- - a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Oφ iff some exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of requirements of the act. -/- We show that this semantics is hyperintensional, and that it can deal with some of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic in a natural way. Finally, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the semantics. (shrink)

Seven recent monographs on the philosophical foundations of library science are discussed in light of the questions the authors ask and the assumptions that underlie the questions asked. The author finds that epistemological discussions frequently identify epistemology with philosophy of science while ontological discussions rest upon reifications, and in both cases there is an absence of attention to ethical and political questions. The author's critique links the absence of ethical and political dimensions in several of the works discussed to an (...) approach to philosophy that offers the reader answers rather than questions. (shrink)